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Benefits to U.S. Agriculture from 
Terminating European Oilseed Subsidies 
During the 1962 Dillon Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the European 
Community committed itself to no import restrictions on soybeans and soybean meal. But 
during the 1980s, subsidies paid to crushers for processing domestic oilseed rose 
dramatically. By 1986 the subsidy had increased European producer prices $216 per metric 
ton. The oilseed subsidies more than doubled the world price of $208 per metric ton and 
European producers responded by doubling their production over the period (Figure 1.) 
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Figure 1. European Community Oilseed Production. 
Source: Marcia Zarley Taylor, Famz Joumal, Washington, DC. 
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In December, 1987 the American Soybean Association (ASA) filed a section 301 
Unfair Trade Petition against the European Community (EC). The petition alleged that the 
EC oilseed subsidies constituted unfair discrimination against imports. The Dispute 
Settlement Panel of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ruled in 
December, 1989 that the European oilseed subsidies violate GATT trading rules and 
discriminate against oilseed imports. European Community officials agreed to abide by the 
ruling and will reportedly bring their programs into compliance. The objective of this paper 
is to estimate the economic impacts on the United States and the European Community if 
the EC eliminates its oilseed subsidies. 
Conceptual Framework 
A conceptual modef in Figure 2 depicts the effect of eliminating EC oilseed subsidy 
Ps- P~ where Psis the EC supported price and P~ is the world price distorted by the EC 
subsidy. Without the oilseed subsidy, supply in the EC is ss and demand is d; supply in the 
rest of the world (ROW) is S and demand is D. Without subsidies, the world price of 
soybeans is P w· EC supply quantity (production) is ~ and demand quantity is qd. European 
imports of soybeans are qd- ~ = Qe from ROW. 
With the oilseed subsidy, the EC soybean supply function is s 's. European oilseed 
excess demand in world markets shifts from ED to ED', excess supply remains at ES, and 
world price falls to P ~- European oilseed imports fall from Qe to a lower quantity q~ - q; 
= o;- o~ = o;. 
2 
EC 
p 
• 
pw 
c 
p' 
w 
B 
0 
p 
Q 0 
EC Import 
Market 
ED 
ROW 
p 
D 
Q 0 
Figure 2. Effect of EC Oilseed Subsidy Elimination on Oilseed Markets. 
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Welfare impacts of elimination of the EC oilseed subsidy are approximated as 
follows: 
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With termination of the subsidy, European Community producers are worse off by area a. 
EC consumers lose area c + d +e. European taxpayers are better off by area a+ b + c +d. Net 
gain to the EC, b-e, is positive if b exceeds e. ROW producers are better off by area 
1+2+3+4 in the right panel. Consumers in ROW lose 1 so net gain to ROW is area 
2+3+4. Net gain to the world is area b+f+2+4 from terminating the EC oilseed subsidy. 
Area b in Figure 2 is gained because the EC no longer is producing oilseeds at costs 
above the border price (P w), areas f and 2 are gained because consumers in the EC and 
ROW no longer are deriving less value than the border price from consuming oilseeds, and 
area 4 is gained because ROW no longer is foregoing production forthcoming at less than 
the border price. The border price, the equilibrium world price, is an opportunity return 
(cost) equal to the marginal value (cost) of oilseeds in production and consumption. The 
conceptual results for ROW apply to the U.S. because the U.S. also is an exporter of 
oilseeds. 
The simplified partial equilibrium conceptual model does not account for individual 
country impacts or interactions among commodities. These are best analyzed with a 
mathematical international trade model. Impacts from oilseed subsidy elimination are 
quantified for the EC and the U.S. in the next section. 
Empirical Analysis 
Impacts of removing EC oilseed subsidies were quantified using a world trade model 
incorporating the assumptions of neoclassical trade theory (see Roningen, et a!.; Sullivan, 
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et al.; Gleckler and Tweeten for description of model). Data for 1989 were used to initialize 
the model. Results reflect changes from 1989 conditions and are in 1989 prices but the 
coefficients apply to an intermediate-run period of 4 to 5 years, other things equal. The 
model simultaneously estimates changes in markets for eight commodities: beef, pork, 
poultry meat, wheat, corn, coarse grains (excluding corn), oilseeds (principally soybeans, 
rapeseed, and sunflower seed), and oilmeal. Substitutability and complementarity among 
commodities are accounted for in behavioral equations. 
Empirically estimated percentage changes in world prices following elimination ofEC 
oilseed subsidies are presented in Table 1. Interestingly, proportional impacts on the price 
of wheat are as great as those on oilseeds. World coarse grain price is substantially lower 
as well. The origin of these price changes is production decisions by European farmers. 
Grains and oilseeds are substitutes in production. Oilseed subsidy elimination reduces 
.. 
oilseed acres and increases' imports, resulting in higher world prices. Grains are substituted 
onto former oilseed acres. Increased EC grain exports and lower world prices result. 
Table 2 presents changes in EC production, consumption, and trade with the 
elimination of oilseed subsidies. The 33 percent drop in production and 1 percent rise in 
consumption combine for a 3,228,000 metric ton increase in oilseed (mostly soybean) 
imports. In the past, subsidized production of oilseeds supplied low-cost feed ingredients 
for livestock producers. Elimination of the subsidies increases feed costs, drops beef, pork, 
and poultry production, and decreases European exports of these products an estimated 
19,000 metric tons (3,000 + 10,000 + 6,000 metric tons). 
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Table 1. Change in World Prices from Eliminating the 
European Oilseed Subsidy. 
Commodity 
Beef 
Pork 
Poultry Meat 
Wheat 
Corn 
Coarse Grain 
Oilseed 
Oilmeal 
%Change 
0.02 
0.03 
0.02 
- 2.40 
- 0.26 
- 1.48 
2.39 
.1.15 
Table 2. Impacts on European Community from Eliminating Oilseed Subsidy. 
• 
Commodity Production Consumption Trade (net e2morts) 
1989 Quantity Change 
(%change) (%change) (1,000 MT) (1,000 MT) (%) 
Beef -0.04 0.00 269 -3 -1.01 
Pork -0.08 0.00 403 -10 -2.51 
Poultry Meat -0.09 0.00 314 -6 -1.75 
Wheat 6.12 0.00 20,164 4,864 24.12 
Corn 0.12 -0.02 -1,830 4 0.23 
Coarse Grain 3.63 -0.02 5,728 2,019 35.24 
Oilseed -33.24 -1.10 -14,162 -3,228 -22.80 
Oilmeal -0.43 -0.50 -12,978 75 0.58 
Because EC demand remains strong for oilseeds and is quite inelastic, and because 
world oilseed import supply is quite elastic, the reduction in EC subsidies shows up more 
in increased imports than in reduced consumption (Table 2). Wheat and coarse grain 
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production, on the other hand, rise substantially in the European Community (Figure 3). 
Oil crops grow side-by-side with grain crops in Europe and at the same time of year. 
Lowering the effective EC producer price by 45 percent (the 1989 subsidy amount) while 
continuing high grain price supports shifts production into grains. This is conceptualized by 
the shift from s to s" in Figure 3. Grain yields in metric tons per hectare are more than 
double oilseed yields and the shift brings substantial increases in grain exports. Less 
livestock production helps reduce demand for grains from d to d ". In Figure 3, EC grain 
exports increase from <Is-qct to q;-q~ when the support price is held at P5• 
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Figure 3. Impact of Oilseed Subsidy Elimination on EC Grain Sector. 
Table 3 presents estimates of impacts on U.S. production and trade. Higher oilseed 
prices cause some soybean acreage expansion at the expense of corn and coarse grain acres. 
Lower world prices also contribute to grain production declines. Increased feeding costs 
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cause a slight decrease in meat production. The U.S. trade position worsens in most 
commodities outside the oilseed sector. The 1,297,000 metric ton increase in U.S. oilseed 
exports amounts to 40 percent of the increase in EC imports (3,228,000 MT). 
Table 3. Impacts on U.S. Markets of Eliminating European Oilseed Subsidy. 
Commodity Production Consumption Trade (net exnorts) 
1989 Quantity Change 
(%change) (%change) (1,000 MT) (1,000 MT) (%) 
Beef -0.03 0.00 -579 -3 -0.52 
Pork -0.01 -0.01 -363 1 0.01 
Poultry Meat -0.07 0.00 426 -7 -1.67 
Wheat -0.81 0.51 34,128 -559 -1.64 
Corn -0.06 -0.03 54,537 -79 -0.14 
Coarse Grain -0.58 0.41 7,125 -274 -3.84 
Oilseed 1.40 -1.06 15,897 1,297 8.16 
Oilmeal -0.43 -0.59 4,545 13 0.29 
Welfare effects are presented in Table 4. As expected, EC producers lose substantial 
income from the elimination of oilseed processing payments. Some of this is recaptured in 
grain production. Oilseed consumers (processors) lose some from higher world price. 
Taxpayers in the Community gain $339 million more than producers and consumers lose. 
World price changes result in substantial U.S. producer losses especially in grains, but those 
losses are more than offset by U.S. producer gains in oilseeds. U.S. consumers show a net 
loss primarily because of higher world oilseed prices. Grain producer and oilseed consumer 
losses combine to fully offset oilseed producer gains in the U.S. 
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Table 4. Welfare Impacts of European Oilseed Subsidy Elimination. 
Commodity Producers Consumers Taxpayers Welfare 
($million) 
European Community 
Beef -5 0 1 
Pork -8 0 4 
Poultry Meat -4 0 2 
Wheat 534 0 -458 
Corn 3 0 1 
Coarse Grains 187 0 -75 
Oilseed -1,662 -167 2,052 
Oihneal 17 -83 0 
Total -938 -250 1,527 339 
United States 
Beef -3 -3 0 
Pork 1 -4 0 
Poultry Meat -4 -1 0 
Wheat .. -110 44 0 
Corn -26 20 0 
Coarse Grains -27 22 0 
Oilseed 250 -178 0 
Oilmeal 29 -22 0 
Total 110 -122 0 -12 
Rest of World 
Beef 15 -10 0 
Pork 20 -17 0 
Poultry Meat 10 -2 0 
Wheat -986 1159 0 
Corn -34 57 0 
Coarse Grains -244 272 0 
Oilseed 633 -669 0 
Oilmeal 49 -119 0 
Total -537 671 0 134 
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Oilseed producers and wheat producers outside the U.S. and the EC (rest of world) 
especially benefit from terminating EC oilseed subsidies (Table 4 ). Deadweight welfare 
gains of $134 million more than offset any losses in the U.S. so that ROW welfare gains are 
positive as predicted by the conceptual model in Figure 2. 
Conclusions 
The GATT ruling on European Community oilseed programs is a victory for the 
American Soybean Association. Estimates indicate the possibility for substantial income 
gains to U.S. soybean producers and European taxpayers if the EC eliminates oilseed 
subsidies. The biggest gainer from removing the market distortion is the EC which imposed 
it. 
Almost 60 percent of the gains to U.S. oilseed producers from eliminating EC oilseed 
subsidies is offset by losses to U.S. grain producers (Table 4). EC production shifts from 
oilseeds into grains which retain their high levels of support, significantly moderating 
potential benefits to U.S. farmers. 
The GATT ruling comes at a time when the European Community is attempting to 
increase border protection and support of soybeans and oilseeds under the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Other crops in the EC (primarily cereal grains) are protected 
and supported to such an extent that "balancing" support to oilseeds is a central issue in 
current CAP policy formulation as well as in trade policy negotiations. ("Balancing" is a 
euphemism for moving toward equal levels of self-sufficiency among commodities through 
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market intervention.) Although European welfare impacts are estimated to be positive with 
the elimination of subsidies, the ruling by the GAIT is a serious setback to balancing 
producer support among oilseeds and other crops. This will probably increase the 
importance of soybeans in the ongoing trade negotiations. It may result in even more 
innovative methods of "balancing" the Common Agricultural Policy. 
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